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Abstract
The results showing a quantum query complexity of Θ(N1/3) for the collision problem do
not apply to random functions. The issues are two-fold. First, the Ω(N1/3) lower bound only
applies when the range is no larger than the domain, which precludes many of the cryptograph-
ically interesting applications. Second, most of the results in the literature only apply to r-to-1
functions, which are quite different from random functions.
Understanding the collision problem for random functions is of great importance to cryptog-
raphy, and we seek to fill the gaps of knowledge for this problem. To that end, we prove that,
as expected, a quantum query complexity of Θ(N1/3) holds for all interesting domain and range
sizes. Our proofs are simple, and combine existing techniques with several novel tricks to obtain
the desired results.
Using our techniques, we also give an optimal Ω(N1/3) lower bound for the set equality
problem. This new lower bound can be used to improve the relationship between classical ran-
domized query complexity and quantum query complexity for so-called permutation-symmetric
functions.
1 Introduction
A collision for a function f consists of two distinct inputs x1, x2, x1 6= x2 that map to the same
value: f(x1) = f(x2). In this note, we explore the difficulty of computing collisions in the quantum
query model: how many quantum queries to an unknown function f are required to produce a
collision? Let M be the size of the domain of f , and N be the size of the codomain.
Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp [BHT97] give a quantum algorithm (henceforth called the BHT
algorithm) requiring O(M1/3) quantum queries to any two-to-one function f to produce a collision
with overwhelming probability. Ambainis [Amb03] gives an O(M2/3) algorithm (which we will
call Ambainis’s algorithm) for finding a collision in an arbitrary function f , guaranteed that it
contains at least one collision. This latter problem is related to the so-called element distinctness
problem, where one is asked to distincguish between an injective function and a function with a
single collision.
On the lower bound side, most of the prior work has also focused on two-to-one functions. In
the case where the domain and co-domain are the same, Aaronson and Shi [AS04] and Ambai-
nis [Amb05] prove an Ω(N1/3) = Ω(M1/3) lower bound for two-to-one functions. The results also
generalize to r-to-one functions. These results also imply an Ω(M2/3) lower bound for the element
distinctness problem.
While the above results provide matching upper and lower bounds for the problems they analyze,
they have a couple crucial limitations:
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• Random functions are, with overwhelming probability, not r-to-one functions. Many images
will have only one pre-image, and others will have many pre-images. Thus, the above results
are not directly applicable to random functions.
• The above lower bounds are proved by showing that Ω(N1/3) queries are necessary to distin-
guish a two-to-one function from a permutation. Since a collision is proof that a function is
not a permutation, this implies an Ω(N1/3) lower bound for finding a collision. This is the
reason the domain and co-domain must be the same. For random functions, it is perfectly
reasonable to discuss the collision problem in settings where the co-domain is much, much
smaller than the domain, and the above approaches will therefore not work directly.
Yuen [Yue13] overcomes some of the above limitations by proving, in the case that the domain
and codomain are the same size, the BHT algorithm does indeed produce a collision for random
functions after O(N1/3) queries. For a lower bound, Yuen proves that Ω(N1/5/ logN) queries are
necessary to produce a collision, using a combination of the r-to-one lower bounds from [AS04] and
the quantum adversary method. However, the proof works by proving the indistinguishability of a
random function from a random permutation, and thus still requires the domain and codomain to
be the same.
We argue, however, that conditional quantum lower bounds for the collision problem for random
functions are actually implicit in the earlier works of Boneh et al. [BDF+11, Zha12a, BZ13]. Their
results show, under several different computational assumptions, a weak lower bound of (logN)ω(1).
Basically, they construct various schemes in the quantum random oracle model, in which all parties
can make quantum queries to a shared random function. In many of the schemes, a collision for
the random function would break the security of the scheme, and can hence be used to break the
underlying computational assumption. By making subexponential hardness assumptions, we can
even improve the lower bound to NΩ(1) queries.
Relevance. Why do we care about the quantum query complexity of finding collisions in random
functions? For starters, the quantum collision problem for random functions is a very natural
problem, perhaps more natural than two-to-one functions.
Second, when looking at random functions, the collision problem and the element distinctness
problem turn out to essentially be one and the same. In particular, when the codomain size N
is quadratic in the domain size M , a random function will be injective with constant probability,
and will have a collision with constant probability. Thus, finding a collision provides a means to
distinguish an injective function from a function with a collision. Therefore, element distinctness
is basically a special case of the collision problem for random functions. This view is in contrast
to most existing quantum query results, which treat collision and element distinctness as highly
related but distinct problems.
Another compelling answer comes from cryptography: hash functions, one of the central primi-
tives in cryptography, are often modeled as random functions. This models generic attacks where
that do not exploit any particular structure of the hash function and simply evaluate the function
on adversarily-chosen inputs. This model is called the random oracle model [BR93].
Moreover, the main security requirement for hash functions is that of collision resistance. In
other words, it should be computationally infeasible to find a collision — two distinct inputs that
map to the same output. Thus, characterizing the quantum query complexity of finding collisions
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in random functions gives insight into the computational difficulty of finding collisions in hash
functions.
Hash functions have wide-spread use in cryptography — they are used in the construction
of efficient signatures, encryption schemes meeting very strong notions of security, and password
management, to name a few. In many of the applications, the domain of the hash function is
much, much larger than the codomain, meaning there are many collisions. Yet, we hope that such
collisions are hard to find. It is important to characterize the difficulty of the collision problem so
that we can understand the security of schemes that use hash functions.
Set Equality. We also consider the related set equality problem, where one is given two injective
functions f and g with a common domain and co-domain, with the promise that their ranges
are identical or disjoint. The BHT algorithm can easily be adapted to solve this problem using
O(N1/3) quantum queries, where N is the size of the domain. However, the best known lower
bound is Ω(N1/5/ logN) due to Midrijanis [Mid04].
Improving the lower bound to Ω(N1/3) would have important implications in relating classical
and quantum query complexity. In particular, Aaronson and Ambainis [AA11] show that, for ev-
ery permutation-symmetric function f , the classical randomized query complexity D(f) is at most
the ninth power of the quantum query complexity: D(f) = O˜(Q(f)9) (where O˜ hides logarith-
mic factors). This result uses Midrijanis’s lower bound for the set equality problem as a black
box. Improving the lower bound to Ω(N1/3) would give an improved D(f) = O˜(Q(f)7) for all
permutation-symmetric functions.
1.1 This work
In this note, we resolve the questions above. In particular, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1.1. Let f be a random function with domain size M and codomain size N . Assume
M = Ω(N1/2). Then the quantum query complexity of finding a collision with constant probability
is Θ(N1/3).
Note that if M = o(N1/2), then there are no collisions with probability approaching 1, so the
collision problem becomes meaningless. Thus, Theorem 1.1 completely characterizes the quantum
query complexity of the collision problem for all sensible parameters.
We also give an optimal lower bound of Ω(N1/3) for the set equality problem:
Theorem 1.2. Let f and g be random injective functions from [N ] to [M ] (M ≥ 2N), conditioned
on either:
• The ranges of f and g are identical
• The ranges of f and g are distinct.
Then any algorithm that distinguishes the two cases with bounded error must make Θ(N1/3) quantum
queries.
As discussed above, using Theorem 1.2 in the proof of Aaronson and Ambainis [AA11] gives an
improved D(f) = O˜(Q(f)7) for all permutation-symmetric functions f .
3
Techniques For our lower bound, we start by improving Yuen’s lower bound to Ω(N1/3) quantum
queries to distinguish a random function from a random permutation. Our techniques are entirely
different, and rely on a lemma from Zhandry [Zha12b] about quantum algorithms distinguishing
distributions of functions. Thus, we can handle the case where M ≤ N .
We then show how to extend the collision bound to the case where M = 2N . Our final step
is to decompose a random function on arbitrary domain and codomain as the composition of a
sequence of functions, where each component function satisfies M = 2N . Using another lemma
of Zhandry [Zha12b] about so-called small-range distributions, we show that this decomposition is
indistinguishable from a random function. Now, any collision for the overall function must yield
a collision for one of the component functions. We can therefore use the lower bound on the
component functions to obtain a lower bound for all functions, as desired.
For our upper bound, we use Ambainis’s element distinctness algorithm as a black box to give
a simple collision finding algorithm. We note that the BHT algorithm actually works for random
functions, providedM = Ω(N2/3). Using Ambainis’s algorithm allows us to cover allM = Ω(N1/2).
2 The Upper Bound
Recall the following theorem of Ambainis [Amb03]:
Theorem 2.1 ([Amb03] Theorem 3). Let f : [M ′] → [N ] be a function that has exactly one
collision. Then there is a quantum algorithm making O((M ′)2/3) quantum queries to f that finds
the collision with bounded error.
We use Ambainis’s algorithm as a black box to prove the following:
Theorem 2.2. Let f : [M ] → [N ] be a random function, and suppose M = Ω(N1/2). Then there
is a quantum algorithm making O(N1/3) quantum queries to f which produces a collision with
constant probability.
The proof is simple, and basically follows the reduction Aaronson and Shi [AS04] to prove
their lower bound on the element distinctness problem. Let M ′ = N1/2/2. Assume for now that
M ′ ≤M . Choose a random subset S of sizeM ′. With probability approaching 1/e as N goes to∞,
S will contain exactly one collision for f . Let f ′ be the restriction of f to S, and run Aimbanis’s
algorithm on f ′. Then with probability essentially 1/e, Ambainis’s algorithm will return a collision.
The query complexity of Ambainis’s algorithm is O((M ′)2/3) = O(N1/3), as desired. In the case
whereM >>M ′, this can be repeated multiple times to obtain arbitrarily high success probabilities.
IfM ′ is not significantly smaller thanM , then there is a constant probability p that no collisions
will be found. However, we can tweak the above algorithm to give us a collision with probability
arbitrarily close to 1− p.
3 The Lower Bound
We now prove our lower bound:
Theorem 3.1. There is a universal constant C such that the following holds. Let f : [M ] → [N ]
be a random function. Then any algorithm making q quantum queries to f outputs a collision for
f with probability at most C(q + 1)3/N .
Thus, to obtain a collision with bounded error requires q = Ω(N1/3) quantum queries.
4
Tools We will be using two important tools due to Zhandry [Zha12b]. The first is the following
Lemma:
Lemma 3.2 ([Zha12b] Theorem 7.3). There is a universal constant C ′ such that the following holds.
Let Dr be a family of distributions on functions from X to Y indexed by r ∈ Z
+ ⋃{∞}. Suppose
that, for every integer k and for every k pairs (xi, ri) ∈ X ×Y, the function p(r) = Prf←Dr [f(xi) =
ri∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}] is a polynomial of degree at most k in 1/r. Then any quantum algorithm making
q quantum queries can only distinguish the distribution Dr from D∞ with probability C ′q3/r.
Zhandry goes on to define the notion of small range distributions, which are essentially the
composition of two random functions where the intermediate space is small. In particular, the
small range distribution (for parameter r) on functions f : X → Y is sampled according to the
following:
• Draw a random function g from X → [r].
• Draw a random function h from [r]→ Y.
• Output the composition f = h ◦ g.
Zhandry then uses Lemma 3.2 to prove the following fact about small range distributions:
Lemma 3.3 ([Zha12b] Corollary 7.5). Let f : X → Y be either drawn uniformly at random, or
from the small range distribution for parameter r. Then any quantum algorithm making q quantum
queries to f can only distinguish the two cases with probability C ′q3/r, where C ′ is the constant
from Lemma 3.2.
Using the two lemmas above, we will now prove Theorem 3.1.
3.1 The case M = N
As a first step, we prove the theorem for M = N .
We define distributions Dr on functions from [N ] to [N ], where sampling is obtained by the
following process:
1. Pick a random function g : [N ]→ [r].
2. Let S = {g(x) : x ∈ [N ]}. That is, S is the set of images of g.
3. Pick a random injective function h : S → [N ].
4. Output the function f = h ◦ g.
Another way of viewing the distributionDr is in terms of collision profiles, used in Yuen’s original
proof [Yue13]. A collision profile counts, for each i, the number of image points of multiplicity i.
Then the distribution Dr can be thought of as choosing a collision profile corresponding to a random
function from [N ] to [r], and then choosing a random function from [N ] to [N ] with the specified
collision profile.
We note three special cases of the distribution Dr:
• D1. This distribution just outputs a random constant function.
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• DN . This distribution outputs a truly random function from [N ] to [N ]. Indeed, the function
g will be a random function, and the function h can be expanded to a random permutation
on [N ]. The composition is therefore a random function.
• D∞. This distribution outputs a random permutation from [N ] to [N ]. The function g is, with
probability 1, an injective function. Since h is injective, the composition h◦g is also injective,
and therefore a permutation. Since h is a random injective function, the composition is a
random permutation.
Therefore, our goal is to show that q quantum queries can only distinguish DN and D∞ with
probability C ′q3/N . This implies that the probability of finding a collision in DN is at most
C ′(q+2)3/N (we use two extra queries to check if the collision is correct. The output of this check
will can distinguish the two cases). We need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4. Fix k pairs (xi, ri) ∈ [N ] × [N ], and let p(r) = Prf←Dr [f(xi) = ri∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}].
Then p is a polynomial in 1/r of degree at most k − 1.
Applying Lemma 3.2, we see that DN = DF is indistinguishable from D∞ = DP with probability
C ′q3/N , as desired.
It remains to prove Lemma 3.4. Due to the symmetry of the distributions Dr, Prf←Dr [f(x) =
r] = 1/N for any (x, r) ∈ [N ] × [N ]. Thus, the claim is true for k = 1. Now, assume the claim is
true for each k′ < k.
We can assume without loss of generality that each of the xi are district. If not, and xi = xj,
there are two cases:
• ri = rj . In this case, we can delete the pair (xj, rj) since it is redundant. We then invoke
Lemma 3.4 using the remaining k − 1 tuples.
• ri 6= rj. Then p(r) = 0 since f(xi) cannot simultaneously equal ri and rj.
Let ℓ = |{ri : i ≤ k − 1}| be the number of distinct ri values, not including rk. Invoking
Lemma 3.4 on the first k − 1 values, we see that
p′(r) = Pr
f←Dr
[f(xi) = ri∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}]
is a polynomial of degree at most k − 2 in 1/r. We now wish to study the conditional probability
Pr
f←Dr
[f(xk) = rk : f(xi) = ri∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}]
Suppose rk = ri for some i < k. This happens exactly when g(xk) = g(xi), which happens with
probability 1/r. Now suppose rk 6= ri for any i < k. This means g(xk) 6= g(xi) for all i < k, which
happens with probability 1− ℓ/r. In this case, h(g(xk)) = rk with probability 1/(N − ℓ). Then the
probability f(xk) = rk, conditioned on the other values, is
(1−ℓ/r)
N−ℓ .
In either case, the value
Pr
f←Dr
[f(xk) = rk : f(xi) = ri∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}]
is a polynomial of degree 1 in 1/r. Combining with p′(r), we see that p(r) is a polynomial of degree
at most k − 1 in 1/r. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.4, and therefore proves Theorem 3.1
for the case M = N .
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3.2 The case M = 2N
Assuming M = 2N , we can write [M ] as {0, 1} × [N ]. Suppose there was an algorithm A that
made q queries to a random function f : {0, 1} × [N ] → [N ], and outputted a collision x1, x2
with probability ǫ. We now construct an algorithm B that makes q queries to a random function
g : {0, 1} × [N ]→ {0, 1} × [N ] and outputs a collision with probability ǫ/2. B works as follows:
• Let f : {0, 1} × [N ] → [N ] be the function obtained from g by dropping the first bit of the
output.
• B simulates A, and when A makes a query to f , B forwards the query to g, and drops the
first bit of the response before returning the response to A. Since quantum operations are
reversible, we cannot just disregard the extra bit. One approach is to uncompute the bit using
a second query to g. Another option is to initialize the qubit where the bit will be written
to to 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉). Recall that quantum queries are typically implemented by XORing the
response of the query into supplied qubits. After the query is performed, regardless if the
output bit is 0 or 1, the state of the qubit will be 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉). Thus we can ignore the qubit
and throw it away.
• When A outputs a candidate collision (x1, x2), B outputs (x1, x2) as a collision for g.
We note that the first bit of output of g is completely independent of A’s view. Also, if
f(x1) = f(x2), then g(x1) = g(x2) exactly when the first bit of output of g is the same in both
cases. This happens with probability 1/2, independent of A’s view. Thus, if A outputs a collision
for f with probability ǫ, B will output a collision for g with probability ǫ/2.
Since ǫ/2 < C ′(q + 2)3/(2N), we have that ǫ < C ′(q + 2)3/N .
3.3 The case M = 2ℓN
Unfortunately, we cannot extend the above analysis to arbitrary M , since the probability that the
candidate collision is correct drops linearly with M/N . Instead, we play a few tricks to turn an
algorithm breaking the M = 2ℓN case into an algorithm breaking the M = 2N case.
Suppose we have an adversary A that makes q queries to a function f : {0, 1}ℓ × [N ] → [N ],
and outputs a collision with probability ǫ.
We now define ℓ hybrids distributions Dk for f (k = 0, . . . , ℓ− 1) as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , k, let fi : {0, 1}
i × [N ]→ {0, 1}i−1 × [N ] be a random function for i = 1, . . . , k.
• Let gk : {0, 1}
ℓ × [N ]→ {0, 1}k × [N ] be a random function.
• Let f = f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fk ◦ g.
We observe that the only difference between Dk and Dk+1 is that gk is replaced with the compo-
sition fk+1 ◦ gk+1. By the small-range distribution theorem, these two cases are indistinguishable.
In particular, if A can distinguish Dk from Dk+1 with probability δ, then we can construct an
algorithm B that makes 2q queries to a random function g that is either gk or fk+1 ◦ gk+1 and
distinguishes the two cases with probability δ. We note that B must make 2 queries for every query
from A in order to uncompute the scratch space used to answer A’s queries. Using Lemma 3.3, we
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know that δ < C ′(2q+2)3/2k+1N (we’ve again included the extra two queries needed to check the
collision).
Thus, f produces a collision in Dℓ−1 with probability at least
ǫ−
C ′(2q + 2)3
N
ℓ−1∑
k=0
1
2k+1
> ǫ−
8C ′(q + 1)3
N
In the case Dℓ−1, f is generated as f1 ◦ f2 ◦ · · · ◦ fℓ where fi : {0, 1}
i × [N ]→ {0, 1}i−1 × [N ] is
a random function. Moreover, any collision for f must yield a collision for one of the fi, which we
already know to be difficult. In particular, if A produces a collision for fi with probability δ, we
know by the M = 2N case that δ < C ′(2q + 2)3)/2i−1N (again we need 2 queries for every query
A makes in the simulation, and two queries for the check at the end).
Thus, we have that
ǫ−
8C ′(q + 1)3
N
<
C ′(2q + 2)3
N
ℓ∑
i=1
1
2i−1
meaning
ǫ <
24C ′(q + 1)3
N
as desired.
3.4 General M
From the above sections, we can conclude that no algorithm can do better than producing a collision
with probability C(q+1)3/N , but only for M/N a power of two. However, it is straightforward to
move to general M . In particular, any adversary that produces a collision when the domain is [M ]
will also work correctly and produce a collision when the domain is [M ′] for any M ′ > M . Thus,
we can round M/N up to the nearest power of two, and the bound obtained there will be valid.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
4 Lower Bound for Set Equality
In this section, we give an optimal lower bound for the Set Equality problem. In the set equality
problem, two injective functions f and g are given with domain [N ] and codomain [M ] with
M ≥ 2N , with the promise that wither the ranges of f and g are identical, or they are disjoint
(notice that the use of M and N is flipped from the above sections). The goal is to distinguish the
two cases. If the ranges are identical, then the BHT collision finding algorithm can be adapted to
find a claw of f and g: two points x1, x2 such that f(x1) = g(x2). Thus, using O(N1/3) quantum
queries, it is possible to distinguish the two cases. Midrijanis [Mid04] shows a Ω(N1/5/ logN) lower
bound for this problem, which is the previous best lower bound.
Our goal is to prove the following theorem, which implies Theorem 1.2:
Theorem 4.1. Let f and g be random injective functions from [N ] to [M ] (M ≥ 2N), conditioned
on either:
• The ranges of f and g are identical
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• The ranges of f and g are distinct.
Then any algorithm that makes a total of q quantum queries to f and g can only solve distinguish
the two cases with probability O(q3/N).
We now prove Theorem 1.2. Let r be an integer. Let f ′, g′ be functions from [N ] into [r]. Let
S be the union of the ranges of f ′ and g′, and let h be a random injective function from S into [M ].
We consider 3 cases:
(1) r = N and f ′ and g′ are random injective functions. Then f and g are random injective
functions, conditioned on their ranges being identical. This is the first case of the set equality
problem
(2) r = N and f ′ and g′ are truly random functions.
(3) r → ∞ and f ′ and g′ are truly random functions. Then f ′ and g′ are, with probability 1,
injective functions and their ranges are distinct. Therefore, f and g are random injective
functions, conditioned on having distinct ranges. This is therefore the second case of the set
equality problem.
We now argue that case (1) is indistinguishable from case (2), which is indistinguishable from
case (3), which completes the proof.
The only difference between (1) and (2) is that f ′ and g′ are switched from random injective
functions to random functions. Theorem 3.1 shows that the probability of distinguishing these two
cases is O(q3/N).
Now, think of f ′ and g′ as a single function with domain [N ]2 ≡ [2N ] and range [r]. Similarly,
think of f and g as a single function from [2N ] to [M ]. Then in cases (2) and (3), the combined
function (f ′, g′) is just a random function. Therefore, (f, g) is actually identical to the distribution
Dr from Section 3, except with domain [2N ] and range [M ] where M ≥ 2N . Even with the
new domain and range, Lemma 3.4 still applies, so we conclude that no quantum algorithm can
distinguish the r = N case form the r =∞ case, except with probability O(q3/N). Thus, cases (2)
and (3) are indistinguishable.
Piecing together, Cases (1) and (3) are indistinguishable, except with probability O(q3/N),
which completes the proof of Theorem 1.2.
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
Given quantum oracle access to a random function f : [M ]→ [N ], we prove that Θ(N1/3) queries
are necessary and sufficient to find a collision with bounded error. One direction for future work
would be to look at non-uniform distributions. For example, what if the outputs of f are not drawn
at uniform, but instead drawn from some distribution with (Renyi) entropy H. Does a Θ(2H/3)
bound apply?
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